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Objective
We determined whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Government of Islamic Republic of the Afghanistan's (GIRoA's) Ministries of Defense and Interior (MoD and MoI) have established effective controls over the contract management process.
Finding
GIRoA MoI and MoD did not have effective controls over the contract management process for U.S. direct assistance funding provided to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces. Specifically, the ministries did not adequately develop, award, execute, or monitor individual contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance. This occurred because the Ministry of Finance (MoF) did not sufficiently oversee MoD and MoI's planning, accounting, and expenditure of U.S. direct assistance funding, and MoD and MoI did not develop internal compliance functions within the ministries to ensure adherence to the Procurement Law and Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters (commitment letters).
MoD and MoI Inspectors General did not adequately oversee the contract management process. This occurred because the Inspectors General did not: identify areas of high risk within the process, conduct compliance audits or inspections, or investigate senior ministry officials.
Furthermore, CSTC-A has not fully developed the capacity of the ministries to operate effectively, independently, and transparently. This occurred because CSTC-A did not hold the ministries
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accountable for not instituting the necessary controls over the contract management process and did not enforce the requirements within the commitment letters.
As a result, future direct assistance funds are vulnerable to increased fraud and abuse because GIRoA had numerous contract award and execution irregularities and Procurement Law and commitment letter violations. Until CSTC-A mitigates these challenges, GIRoA will continue to depend on Coalition-provided capabilities.
Management Actions Taken
During the audit, we made observations and several suggestions to improve GIRoA and CSTC-A controls over U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A reported several initiatives either planned or implemented to provide stronger controls over U.S. direct assistance. These initiatives included stricter language added to the commitment letters, improving the ministry IGs' oversight, and building ministerial capacity. 
Introduction

Transition to the Resolute Support Mission
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been helping the ANSF conduct security operations throughout the country. Since 2011, responsibility for security has gradually been given to the Afghans, and ISAF's mission has shifted from a combat role to an enabling role focused on training, advising, and assisting. With the launch of the final stage of the transition process in June 2013, the ANSF have taken the lead for security across the whole country. Thus, ISAF will complete its mission at the end of 2014.
Most notably, Essential Function 1 is focused on the ANSF's resource management and procurement departments, with an emphasis to generate funding requirements, develop a resource-informed budget, and follow through by responsibly executing the spending plan.
Essential Function 2 will ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight in the ANSF's financial and nonfinancial processes. The focus of capacity development efforts on eight essential functions is intended to develop the long-term sustainability of the Afghan security institutions and security forces. 
Afghanistan Ministry of Finance
Afghanistan Ministries of Defense and Interior
MoD and MoI are responsible for managing the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, respectively. The Afghanistan MoD and MoI are responsible for developing, validating, and justifying requirements for their annual budget, to include the use of ASFF direct contributions. The ministries must also design and implement internal controls to ensure that the ASFF direct contributions are used as intended. MoD and MoI are required to build the capacity and capability to manage the commitment, obligation, and expenditure of ASFF direct contributions, to include the development and maintenance of supporting documentation. 
Transition of ANSF Service Contract Requirements
As of December 2014, CSTC-A managed 83 contracts supporting GIRoA, valued at approximately $1.54 billion, required to sustain the ANSF. However, by 2029, 37 of these contracted requirements, valued at approximately $525.6 million, are expected to transition to GIRoA to award and manage. Furthermore, CSTC-A has not fully developed the capacity of the ministries to operate effectively, independently, and transparently for contracting. This occurred because CSTC-A did not hold the ministries accountable for not instituting the necessary controls over the contract management process and did not consistently enforce the requirements within the commitment letters.
As a result, future direct assistance funds are vulnerable to fraud and abuse because GIRoA had numerous contract award and execution irregularities and Procurement Law and commitment letter violations. For example, the MoD significantly overestimated fuel requirements, accepted both late and altered bids for a fuel contract award, and could not provide sufficient documentation to support $76 million in fuel requirements and deliveries on a previously MoD-awarded contract. 3 CSTC-A does have initiatives underway to address the capacity shortfalls for contract management within the ministries; however, until it mitigates these challenges, GIRoA will continue to depend on Coalition-provided capabilities.
3 According to CSTC-A officials, the base contract was awarded for $61 million; however, GIRoA immediately increased the contract by 25 percent ($15 million). 
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GIRoA Has Not Fully Established or Effectively Managed the Contract Management Process
The GIRoA ministries have not fully instituted or effectively managed the process for awarding, executing, or monitoring contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A's efforts to mentor and advise focused to establish and develop the capabilities of MoD and MoI to manage the contracting process for U.S. direct assistance in support of the ANSF. CSTC-A's goal is to increase ministerial capacity to the point where MoD and MoI can demonstrate that U.S. direct assistance is being appropriately used. CSTC-A then plans to transfer the management of large service contracts, such as fuels and vehicle maintenance, to CSTC-A-funded, ministry-awarded and managed contracts. To make progress to achieve those goals, GIRoA could improve its controls over the contracting process by complying with legal and commitment letter requirements and performing more robust contract oversight.
GIRoA Did Not Properly Develop Requirements, Award Contracts, or Monitor Contractor Performance
The ministries do not have the ability to adequately develop, award, execute, or monitor contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A assisted MoD and MoI with budget development, execution, payment, and internal operations to ensure transparency and efficiency. However, the ministries continue to remain heavily dependent upon CSTC-A for contract management assistance. Specifically, improvements are needed for defining the contract management process, accurately defining requirements, justifying contract value increases, and monitoring contractor performance.
MoI Did Not Have a Defined and Documented Contract Management Process
According to CSTC-A officials, MoI did not establish a defined and documented contract management process from requirements development through invoice and payment for its goods and services. A defined and documented process is critical for ensuring that all goods and services are ordered, delivered, and received in accordance with the procurement plan, and that the contractor's performance is adequately managed. In addition, it provides transparency and accountability, ensures compliance with procurement regulations, and establishes a monitoring and payment system. CSTC-A officials stated that they did not know if standardized processes within the budgetary units and provincial procurement offices of MoI were in place. As a result, CSTC-A officials are not certain whether MoI consistently complied with the GIRoA Procurement Law. From an advisory standpoint, CSTC-A officials stated the absence of a documented process did not allow CSTC-A's senior advisors the opportunity to review a process to identify risks and vulnerabilities and make the required corrections and recommendations. For example, the Special Procurement Commission increased the previously awarded MoD 1/3 Fuel contract by more than $15 million (25 percent) within 5 days of the original contract award date and asked CSTC-A to pay for it. According to CSTC-A officials, MoD did not have any operational or financial requirements to support the increase. Ultimately, because CSTC-A officials determined the increase to be "unjustified" and a "possible vehicle for corruption," they refused to pay for the $15 million increase.
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MoD Did Not Accurately Develop Fuel Requirements
Ministries Did Not Properly Monitor Contractor Performance
According to CSTC-A officials, the ministries did not actively monitor and document contractor performance. GIRoA-developed guidance titled "The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement" and the Procurement Law require ministry verification of goods and services procured to ensure the correct quantity was received, met the technical standards defined in the contract, and was delivered on time. However, CSTC-A officials stated the GIRoA contracting process lacked a contracting officer's representative function; 6 instead, the ministries may appoint an inspection committee for each contract to ensure qualitative and quantitative procurement performance. Yet, the inspection committee is not provided with defined procedures to ensure contractor performance. As a result, CSTC-A officials stated that ministry inspections are ineffective. For example, when CSTC-A officials attempted to reconcile documentation for the MoD 1/3 Fuel contract, they determined that MoD had not started the inspections and that it had no forms to document how much fuel it received from the contractors.
GIRoA Did Not Comply with Procurement Law and Commitment Letters
GIRoA Procurement Law regulates the public procurement of goods and services and ensures transparency in procurement proceedings, while the commitment letters between GIRoA and CSTC-A implement internal controls over the contract 
Procurement Law Violations
The ministries violated several GIRoA Procurement Law provisions when awarding contracts. GIRoA Procurement Law provides detailed guidance on the bid submission and evaluation processes of potential contractor bids. Article 32, "Submission of Bids," stated that bids submitted after the deadlines are rejected. Furthermore, Article 33, "Opening and Evaluation of Bids," stated the procuring entity will not accept any requests for changes in, or negotiate any terms of the bids with the potential bidders.
According to CSTC-A officials, the MoD Acquisition Agency accepted late bids and allowed vendors to alter their bids after submission. For example, a bidder on the previously awarded MoD 1/3 Fuel contract submitted a bid within the established timeframe. However, according to CSTC-A officials, the bidder was allowed to submit two bids after the bidding process closed; both bids were lower each time and eventually, the bidder won the $76 million contract.
Commitment Letter Violations
The ministries violated several commitment letter requirements. For example, the commitment letter required that the ministries maintain auditable records of all disbursements, including supporting documentation. CSTC-A CJ8 audits determined that the ministries did not consistently maintain contracts, invoices, and disbursement documents. Specifically, for the MoI's Municipal Services contract, CJ8 auditors stated MoI could not locate contracts to allow auditors to validate performance requirements against the goods received. In addition, MoI could not provide supporting documentation for M-16 7 payment orders, valued at $3.1 million. As a result, CJ8 recommended withholding $3.1 million from MoI for the unaccountable and unsupported M-16 payment orders.
7 According to CSTC-A officials, the M-16 is a GIROA Request for Payment form required for the payment of goods and services. No government payment is to be made without a properly prepared and authorized M-16 with appropriate supporting documentation.
According to CSTC-A officials, the MoD Acquisition Agency accepted late bids and allowed vendors to alter their bids after submission. 
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Oversight of the Contract Management Process Needs Improvement
GIRoA did not adequately monitor the ministries' use of U.S. direct assistance. The Procurement Law and the Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement regulate the GIRoA contract management process. These documents outline the general policies and procedures for the ministries to follow to award and administer contracts consistently and transparently. MoD and MoI need internal and independent oversight to improve the contract management process that identifies and corrects instances of ministry noncompliance. However, according to CSTC-A officials, the GIRoA offices responsible for providing this oversight-the internal audit offices of MoF, MoD, MoI-did not perform this function.
Ministry of Finance Oversight
CSTC-A officials stated the MoF's PPU did not adequately oversee the ministries' contract management process. Article 80 of the Procurement Law created PPU within MoF as a performance monitor in the field of procurement. PPU issued guidelines (referred to as circulars) for the general interpretation and application of the Procurement Law. For example, PPU Circular 1 required the ministries to prepare an annual procurement plan and directed PPU to supervise and monitor how their procurement plans were executed. PPU Circular 7 required PPU to monitor the ministry's proceedings to determine efficiency and compliance. Specifically, PPU is required to conduct audits to ensure compliance with the GIRoA Procurement Law. In addition, PPU Circular 3 created the Contract Management Office as the authority to regulate and coordinate the management of procurement contracts.
Although this office was responsible for contract management, CSTC-A officials stated PPU did not detect that MoD contracts were often not in line with the procurement plan and included many unanticipated requirements, often significantly overstated, and that contract irregularities existed.
Ministries Need to Conduct Internal Audits
CSTC-A officials stated that the ministry internal audit offices were ineffective. According to MoF, a key role of internal auditing is providing assurance that internal controls are in place and designed to reduce risks and achieve program goals and objectives. MoF envisioned an internal audit office within each ministry to:
• determine the level of compliance with established laws, policies, procedures, and plans; • appraise the soundness, adequacy, and application of accounting, financial, and other controls in place; and
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• ensure the integrity and reliability of financial and operational information produced by each ministry.
CSTC-A officials said they were unaware of any ministry internal audits or the capacity of the offices to conduct them. For example, the ministries' internal audit office did not detect the significant internal control problems identified by routine CJ8 audits. For example, one CJ8 audit determined that MoD "lacked controls to provide reasonable assurance it appropriately spent 6,247,677,672 Afghani ($120,564,988) for clothing requirements." To address these concerns, the CJ8 audit made several recommendations to MoD, including establishing a secondary review process to ensure all payment orders are entered into Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS). In addition, CJ8 recommended CSTC-A withhold more than $32 million from future disbursements for noncompliant purchases, and has withheld the funding from the FY 1394 MoD commitment letter.
GIRoA Ministry Inspectors General Did Not Identify Areas of High Risk and Did Not Conduct Compliance Audits
The MoD and MoI IGs did not adequately oversee the contract management process. This occurred because the IGs did not: identify areas of high risk within the process, conduct compliance audits or inspections, or investigate senior ministry officials.
According to CSTC-A officials, the ministry IGs did not conduct risk assessments to determine the highest risk areas in the contract management process. This step is critical to effective oversight because it identifies areas the IGs need to focus on to determine whether GIRoA has adequate internal controls in place to protect U.S. direct assistance funding from fraud, waste, and abuse.
GIRoA has issued policies, procedures, and guidance addressing the contract management process; however, CSTC-A officials continue to identify recurring deficiencies and weaknesses in the process during their audits. Consistent, One CJ8 audit determined that MoD "lacked controls to provide reasonable assurance it appropriately spent 6,247,677,672 Afghani ($120,564,988) for clothing requirements." comprehensive, and effective oversight of the high-risk areas will improve the process, reduce corruption, and ensure that contractor performance is in accordance with contract requirements, that overpayments do not occur, and that services were provided. Furthermore, the ministry IGs did not investigate senior ministry officials. For example, CSTC-A officials provided a letter from the GIRoA Office of National Security Council, Executive Office, alleging "blatant and gross violations of the Procurement Law" with respect to the MoD 1/3 Fuel contract. The National Security Council provided this letter to the MoD and MoD IG in March 2014; however, according to CSTC-A officials, the MoD and MoD IG did not investigate the matter. According to CSTC-A officials, the IGs were not independent from ministry officials, which made them reluctant to identify and investigate any allegations of fraudulent activities. As a result, CSTC-A officials stated that the IGs did not report a single case of fraud or abuse by a general officer to the GIRoA Attorney General's office for prosecution.
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During our meeting with MoD IG officials in September 2014, they stated their office inspected ministry operations, including the previously awarded MoD 1/3 Fuel contract. We requested copies of their inspection and audit reports. MoD IG officials stated they would translate the reports and provide them to CSTC-A for us. In addition, MoD IG officials stated they have previously provided CSTC-A with their inspection and audit reports. However, CSTC-A officials stated they have repeatedly requested copies of any MoD IG reports; yet, the MoD IG has not provided any reports. As of December 2014, the MoD IG had not provided the reports we requested. CSTC-A officials need the MoD IG reports to gage the capacity and willingness of the IG offices to identify fraud, waste, and abuse.
CSTC-A Has Not Developed the Required Level of Ministerial Capacity
CSTC-A has not adequately developed the ministries' capacity to manage U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A's U.S. Direct Assistance Standard Operating Procedure stated its senior advisors were required to ensure the ministries established appropriate standard operating procedures and maintained adequate fiscal controls and auditable records of all disbursements, including supporting documentation. In addition, CSTC-A sought to develop ministerial capacity by assisting and overseeing the ministries' budget development, execution, payment, and internal operations to ensure transparency and efficiency. We cannot let the Afghans fail. When required, we must be prepared to step in and 'do' what needs to be done to insure [sic] failure does not occur.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Because of this approach, CSTC-A officials often performed ministerial functions, did not enforce commitment letter requirements, and allowed MoF to exclude their mentoring presence.
CSTC-A Often Performed Ministerial Functions
According to CSTC-A officials, to prevent future ANSF operational failures, such as the lack of fuel for military vehicles to conduct patrols, CSTC-A often developed the requirements and procurement plans for the ministries. By developing and validating the ministries' requirements and procurement plans, CSTC-A ensured timeliness and accuracy; however, it also created a continued dependence by the ministries on CSTC-A.
CSTC-A Assisted with Requirements Development
(U//REL TO NATO/ISAF/AFG) CSTC-A's Direct Assistance Standard Operating Procedure required CSTC-A officials to provide advice during the requirements development, validation, and delivery phases. CSTC-A officials stated they often developed and validated requirements for the ministries, because in many instances, ministry officials did not analyze consumption data or identify ANSF priorities to determine the exact amount required. The ministries instead took the last year's requirements and added 10 percent when developing requirement projections.
In addition, CSTC-A officials stated the ministries frequently provided requirements packages that were not executable. For example, MoD senior advisors stated that approximately 100 packages were rejected, and MoD had to resubmit the packages, which resulted in delays. CSTC-A officials stated that it was easier for them to do the analysis and develop an accurate requirements projection. CSTC-A officials stated they performed the analysis, which resulted in more timely and accurate requirements, and better protected U.S. direct assistance funding. 
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CSTC-A Assisted Developing Ministry Procurement Plan
The Procurement Plan defines each ministry's spending priorities for force sustainment. CSTC-A officials stated the ministries were continually late with their procurement plan submissions and did not develop meaningful procurement plans. For example, CSTC-A officials stated that MoI developed its annual procurement plan without considering the requirements necessary to support the National Police Strategy. According to CSTC-A officials, this occurred because the ministries relied upon CSTC-A's review to identify inconsistencies and gaps within their plans. Consequently, CSTC-A officials stated it was easier and faster to develop the plans for the ministries. However, this approach did not increase the capacity within the ministries to independently develop their plans.
CSTC-A Did Not Consistently Enforce Internal Controls in the Commitment Letters
CSTC-A did not enforce the ministries' compliance with commitment letter requirements that established key internal controls over U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A agreed to fund MoD and MoI as long as the ministries demonstrated continued progress in improving transparency, accountability, and oversight of direct assistance by following multiple conditions. According to CSTC-A officials, commitment letter conditions were to help GIRoA implement the necessary oversight and controls to satisfy independent auditors and the International Community. The ministries struggled to comply with two commitment letter requirements on the use of the AFMIS and maintaining auditable records of disbursements.
Afghanistan Financial Management Information System
The commitment letters contained conditional requirements for the ministries, such as the mandatory use of the AFMIS Purchasing model before contract award. According to CSTC-A officials, AFMIS is a critical internal control feature for CSTC-A because it provides data to conduct internal audits and identify ineligible disbursements. In addition, CSTC-A officials stated that AFMIS, if fully implemented, would help build confidence in the ministries' management of U.S. direct assistance. The commitment letters stated that any contract awarded and payment made outside of these systems will not be funded with direct assistance. However, CSTC-A officials acknowledged that the ministries did not consistently abide by this commitment letter requirement. 
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Maintaining Auditable Records
The commitment letters required that the ministries maintain auditable records of all disbursements and supporting documentation; however, CSTC-A officials stated that the ministries did not maintain the required documentation. For example, GIRoA payments require a properly prepared and authorized M-16, with appropriate supporting documentation. CJ8 audits identified instances where payments were made without the M-16s. CJ8 audits also determined internal control weaknesses with identifying M-16s containing incorrect object codes that could not be linked to the correct contracts. This is a significant internal control issue that, if not corrected, could allow multiple payments to vendors for the same goods or services. Furthermore, CSTC-A officials stated that in many cases, the ministries could not provide the contract, invoice, or disbursement documents.
Ministerial Oversight Capacity Suffered Because the MoF Removed CSTC-A Advisors
According to CSTC-A officials, the limited oversight capacity of MoF was a direct result of its decision to remove CSTC-A advisors from its offices approximately 3 years ago. The Procurement Law established PPU to monitor the GIRoA's procurement process. Specifically, PPU oversaw the ministries' procurement plans, procurement proceedings, and contract management. However, CSTC-A officials stated that PPU did not perform this oversight. Without this oversight, the ministries awarded and managed contracts that did not comply with the provisions of GIRoA's Procurement Law.
CSTC-A officials stated their advisors could have improved ministerial oversight capacity to help the MoF and PPU identify risk areas within the contract management process, develop audit plans, and conduct audits to determine whether the ministries complied with applicable GIRoA Procurement Law and regulations.
To Build Capacity and Transparency, CSTC-A Officials Must Hold GIRoA Accountable
As a result, future direct assistance funds are vulnerable to fraud and abuse because GIRoA had numerous contract award and execution irregularities and Procurement Law and commitment letter violations. CSTC-A officials' past concerns focused on maintaining gains made by the ANSF; therefore, they allowed the ministries to violate commitment letter requirements and Procurement Laws without financial repercussions. However, this approach resulted in the continued reliance upon CSTC-A and a potential increase of fraudulent activities within the ministries. CSTC-A officials acknowledged this approach worked in the short term; however, it did not build the ministerial capacity required for GIRoA to manage U.S. direct assistance.
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Providing senior advisors to mentor the ministries and including strict internal controls within the commitment letters will help build capacity and transparency as long as CSTC-A officials hold GIRoA accountable. Specifically, CSTC-A needs to require that the three ministries (MoD, MoI, and MoF) and their IGs perform the internal and external oversight roles necessary to identify, report, and correct contract irregularities; and investigate corruption and fraudulent activities.
CSTC-A officials stated they are now using a "controlled failure" approach. This approach allows GIRoA officials to struggle so they learn to cope with the consequences. For example, CSTC-A is committed to holding the ministry and contractor accountable for providing the required documentation to substantiate delivery and consumption for the recently awarded MoD Fuel contract. If the required documentation is not available, CSTC-A will deduct 25 percent, and MoD will have to determine how to accommodate the shortage. CSTC-A officials stated, for instance, if the 207th Corps cannot support a $16 million payment request for fuel, it would receive $12 million. MoD will have to determine how to make up for the shortage, which may involve shifting fuel from one Corps to another. According to CSTC-A officials, the message to GIRoA officials will be that they must solve their problems in the future and not rely on CSTC-A to do it for them.
CSTC-A Initiatives to Improve Controls for Direct Assistance
During the audit, we made several suggestions to improve GIRoA and CSTC-A controls over U.S. direct assistance. In November 2014, CSTC-A reported several initiatives were either planned or implemented to provide stronger controls over the management of U.S. direct assistance. These initiatives included stricter language added to the commitment letters, improving the ministry IGs' oversight, and building ministerial capacity. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Stricter Language Added to the Commitment Letters
CSTC-A officials agreed that the language in previous commitment letters provided the GIRoA ministries with too much room for interpretation. CSTC-A officials thoroughly reviewed previous commitment letters and the past performance of MoD, MoI, and MoF, and took steps to improve the GIRoA management of U.S. direct assistance. For example, CSTC-A officials reviewed the MoD 1/3 Fuel contract and discovered MoF put the original contract amount, $61 million, on a letter of credit (essentially an advance to the central bank that the vendor could draw on). MoF executed the letter of credit without CSTC-A knowledge and approval. CSTC-A mandated that all letters of credit using U.S. direct assistance require advance CSTC-A approval in the FY 1394 commitment letters.
Improved Oversight by Ministry Inspectors General
During our conversations with CSTC-A officials responsible for increasing the capacity of the ministry IGs, we expressed our concerns about their apparent lack of oversight and unwillingness to investigate instances of alleged fraud. CSTC-A officials stated they developed a comprehensive program that will help the IGs identify the high-risk areas within the contract management process. According to CSTC-A officials, the MoD IG, in November 2014, agreed to implement the program, with the expectation of full implementation by December 2015. After the ministry IGs identify the high-risk areas within the contract management process, CSTC-A's senior advisors to the ministries will then focus their efforts on mentoring their ministry counterparts to make the necessary adjustments to reduce the risks; while CSTC-A's senior advisors to the ministry IGs will mentor their counterparts to include these areas in their annual audit plans.
With respect to investigating senior GIRoA officials involved in potentially corrupt activities, in November 2014, CSTC-A officials mentioned the IGs had independently identified and investigated two cases against general officers and were referring those cases to the GIRoA Attorney General's office.
In addition, we suggested CSTC-A include a condition in the commitment letters requiring that ministry IGs provide CSTC-A with copies of all audits and inspections conducted over U.S. direct assistance. CSTC-A officials agreed with our suggestion; however, they indicated at the time of our suggestion, it was too late to include this condition in the FY 1394 commitment letters. CSTC-A officials stated they would include this requirement when GIRoA provides its list of carryover contracts in January 2015. In addition, CSTC-A officials stated they will address the issue in the FY 1395 commitment letters. Furthermore, CSTC-A officials stated they would review the ministry IGs' audits and inspections to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance on the ministries' compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
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Holding GIRoA Accountable for Procurement Law and Commitment Letters Violations
CSTC-A officials agreed with our assessment that they must hold GIRoA accountable for violations of the Procurement Law and commitment letters. CSTC-A officials provided several examples in which they held GIRoA accountable. For example, CSTC-A officials determined that MoD and MoI abused their FY 1392 food contracts. The ministries incurred more than $78 million in food bills over the mutually agreed-to commitment letter levels. The ministries continue to ask CSTC-A to pay this amount; however, CSTC-A has refused to pay.
Ministerial Capacity Building Efforts
CSTC-A officials acknowledged that MoD and MoI lacked the capacity and capability to manage U.S. direct assistance. However, with the change of mission to Resolute Support, CSTC-A is shifting its emphasis to "functionally based" 8 advising, with the intent of building the capability and capacity of MoD and MoI to manage U.S. direct assistance.
Subject Matter Experts
CSTC-A awarded a ministerial advisory contract to increase financial management capacity and internal control systems. This contract provides Western-educated Afghan nationals as subject matter experts (SMEs) and technical experts to train, advise, support, and enhance the operational and strategic capabilities of MoD and MoI with the intent of improving ministerial effectiveness. For example, CSTC-A officials stated that approximately 270 SMEs will be available in January 2015 and sent to the ministries to focus on improving program management, processes and systems development, and acquisition and procurement competencies.
During the audit, we suggested that CSTC-A use SMEs to improve the capacity and abilities of several offices within the ministries. For example, we suggested that SMEs be placed at the budgetary units to mentor the requirements development process, at the provincial level to define and document MoI's contract management process, and within the ministries to develop the capacity to audit internal controls. In November 2014, CSTC-A officials agreed and stated they will assign several SMEs to address these areas within the ministries. By implementing the report recommendation, CSTC-A could use the ministerial advisory contract to place SMEs within the ministries to develop and increase the capacity to independently develop, award, execute, and monitor contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance to sustain the ANSF.
Bi-Weekly Contractor Meetings
According to CSTC-A officials, the MoD and the contractor presented documentation in support of the $76 million MoD 1/3 Fuel contract, which CSTC-A determined to be both insufficient and fraudulent. Specifically, there was a lack of fuel requirements, and there was "doctored" documentation for the amount of fuel delivered. Even though CSTC-A refused to pay for the $15 million modification, CSTC-A officials stated they wanted to avoid that situation on future large dollar contracts. Therefore, CSTC-A established bi-weekly contractor meetings to vet contractor invoice documentation.
The meetings, consisting of CSTC-A, the contractor, and ministry officials, allow CSTC-A officials to review the contractor's documentation and evaluate its adequacy and completeness. CSTC-A officials stated they used this meeting to show the contractor and ministry officials the required documentation needed. With each successive meeting, CSTC-A officials stated they took on more of an advisory position and provided guidance as responsibility passed to ministry officials to review the contractor's documentation. As a testament to the success of the bi-weekly contractor meetings, CSTC-A officials pointed to the MoI fuel contract. According to CSTC-A officials, the contractor provided the required documentation, and both the contractor and ministry officials learned exactly what documentation was required for payment.
CSTC-A included in the FY 1394 MoD commitment letter mandatory bi-weekly fuel meetings between MoD, contracted vendors, and CSTC-A representatives. The focus of the meetings will be to determine whether MoD consumption and fuel deliveries have been documented transparently and to verify that fuel orders were based upon actual consumption needs of vehicles, equipment, and operations. 
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Re-Engaging Ministry of Finance
CSTC-A officials agreed with our assessment that MoF needed to provide more oversight of the contract management process. CSTC-A officials stated part of the problem was that CSTC-A did not have a senior advisor to MoF in several years to build its capacity to oversee the process. In late October 2014, CSTC-A officials re-engaged with MoF officials, who granted CSTC-A office space. In November 2014, CSTC-A officials appointed three liaisons to MoF and considered methods to further increase MoF's capacity with additional SMEs.
We suggested CSTC-A's MoF liaisons request the MoF's PPU conduct comprehensive assessments of the MoD and MoI contract management capacity, from requirements development through contract execution. These assessments will identify high-risk areas for the ministries, which will allow CSTC-A to dedicate advisors to those areas in need. CSTC-A officials agreed with our suggestion and stated it will be included within their capacity-building efforts. The Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan will focus on three functional areas:
Continued Oversight Presence Under the Resolute Support Mission
• train, advise, and assist;
• foreign military financing/pseudo foreign military sales; and
• grant program oversight.
The grant program oversight function will be responsible for oversight of continued direct assistance funding to GIRoA. The current CJ8 function will be absorbed into grant program oversight to provide increased transparency and accountability. The exact number, location, and types of positions for the office are still being 
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments
The Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, agreed, stating that the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan has implemented a number of programs and initiatives to address the concerns in this report. For example, in addition to providing subject matter experts to support the eight key functional areas, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is developing the Corps and Provincial Specialists Program to provide Afghan experts as advisors at each of the Corps/Regional headquarters. The program will provide qualified expertise in several functional areas, such as contracting, budgeting, and rule of law. For more details on the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's programs and initiatives, see pages 26-28.
Furthermore, the Deputy Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan, supported the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's response and approach.
Our Response
Comments from the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. The proposed actions meet the intent of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
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